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Market Talk
- Thread starter Spaf
- Start date
grandma
Well-known member
imported post
carloc wrote:
carloc wrote:
Thank you - these are a bit more detailed than the ones at: http://www.investionary.com/investment-dictionary.htm
Spaf
Honorary Hall of Fame Member
imported post
The Kingdom of TSP
Attached is a Doodle of the S&P, with a Slow Stoch indicator. MAYBE with the recent double bottom we are headed up. But how far is up, with this unstable market? Day by day the market can change based on the perception of the Horsemen (rates, earnings, energy, and inflation).
Therefore my maximun allocation is 50% to equities (C, S, I). 50% or more will be safeguarded in the secure funds of G or F. The G fund seems to produce the better results YTD.
Will stay holding 50/50 for the interm. But will keep a 100% transfer to theG-fund activated at every AM.
Attachment
Rgds!
Spaf
The Kingdom of TSP
Attached is a Doodle of the S&P, with a Slow Stoch indicator. MAYBE with the recent double bottom we are headed up. But how far is up, with this unstable market? Day by day the market can change based on the perception of the Horsemen (rates, earnings, energy, and inflation).
Therefore my maximun allocation is 50% to equities (C, S, I). 50% or more will be safeguarded in the secure funds of G or F. The G fund seems to produce the better results YTD.
Will stay holding 50/50 for the interm. But will keep a 100% transfer to theG-fund activated at every AM.
Attachment
Rgds!
Spaf
Dogdaddy
Member
imported post
Look out...here we go again.....
10 min ago
[BRIEFING.COM]Market continues to retrace earlier lows, as all ten economic sectors now trade in negative territory...Meanwhile, total volume is running ahead of Monday's sluggish pace, as 1.0 bln shares have now traded on the Nasdaq, arguably providing a bit more conviction behind today's weakness than the limited participation behind yesterday's upside momentum... NYSE Adv/Dec 1242/1938...Nasdaq Adv/Dec 1043/1891
Look out...here we go again.....
10 min ago
[BRIEFING.COM]Market continues to retrace earlier lows, as all ten economic sectors now trade in negative territory...Meanwhile, total volume is running ahead of Monday's sluggish pace, as 1.0 bln shares have now traded on the Nasdaq, arguably providing a bit more conviction behind today's weakness than the limited participation behind yesterday's upside momentum... NYSE Adv/Dec 1242/1938...Nasdaq Adv/Dec 1043/1891
The_Technician
Active member
imported post
I noticed todaythe 200 day average is approx 1154 on the S&P 500.......:shock:
The Technician.:^
I noticed todaythe 200 day average is approx 1154 on the S&P 500.......:shock:
The Technician.:^
imported post
Spaf wrote:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1844476
Spaf wrote:
Referring to Colin Powell's famous warning about Iraq. Spaf... not sure what you are saying here... you mad at me?
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1844476
Spaf
Honorary Hall of Fame Member
imported post
Timer wrote:
Yes, Timer, sometimes I tend to talk in odd terms. A bright era but also a dark era, it's something I live with!
Rgds! Spaf
Timer wrote:
Na I ain't mad at you, Timer! It's what CP was trying to say. "Powell was supportive of the war in public in an effort to win international support. But he was also concerned about the complications of a war". It seems that wars are undertaken without knowning much about the "complications". Some of us remember "The Bright Shinning Lie".
Yes, Timer, sometimes I tend to talk in odd terms. A bright era but also a dark era, it's something I live with!
Rgds! Spaf
teknobucks
Active member
imported post
is it gonna be:
http://www.bullandbearwise.com/TopOverlayChart.asp
or perhaps a 1987:
http://www.lope.ca/markets/1987.html
is it gonna be:
http://www.bullandbearwise.com/TopOverlayChart.asp
or perhaps a 1987:
http://www.lope.ca/markets/1987.html
teknobucks
Active member
imported post
good article on why 87 may repeat itself....MAY, only MAY
Events and the Economy in 1987
It is very difficult to determine any specific events or economic conditions that markets may have been reacting to on October 19, 1987. Looking back at the crash from hindsight, many people have scoured through the flow of events prior to the decline to find a potential cause. What they have found is not very convincing - they seem to be reaching to the bottom of the bucket for justification. The events and changes in economic conditions were not earth-shattering. It is beyond the scope of logic to attribute a 22% decline in markets the world over to any of them.
In a question in his post-1987 survey, Robert Shiller asked: "Which of the following best describes your theory about the decline: a theory about investor psychology, or a theory about fundamentals such as profits or interest rates?" 67.5% of individual investors and 64% of institutional investors said the crash was about market psychology. It seems there is an unspoken consensus that the market decline was driven by psychology, though this is overshadowed by an accepted theory that events and program trading drove the decline. When Shiller asked what major events people in his survey were reacting to during the day of the crash, the most popular response was the price decline and the behaviour of others during the decline, not fundamental economic changes. Shiller concludes that there were two channels by which price declines fed back into further declines. "First, a price-to-price channel: investors on October 19 were reacting to price changes. Second, a social psychological channel: investors were directly reacting to each other." No events from the physical world are part of Shiller's conclusion. The price-to-price explanation explains why markets may have fallen as far and fast as they did, while the social psychological channel explains the international scope of the decline. These two explanations fail to account for why the crash occurred on October 19 and not any other day. Like the program trading argument, Shiller's psychological explanation is circular, requiring an initial price change to encourage further price changes. This origins of the initial price change are left unexplained. Still, Shiller's perspective explains more than most have been able to.
Let me now focus on some of the specific events that have been credited with sparking the crash. An ongoing spat between Iran and the U.S. had been playing itself out in 1987. The weekend of the crash, the U.S. attacked an Iranian offshore platform, reacting to an earlier Iran attack on American registered vessels in the Persian Gulf. Just because the attack was conveniently situated immediately prior to the crash in time does not mean it is a legitimate explanation. On January 16, 1979, the day the Shah fled Iran, the Dow decline only 1.5%. The arrival of Khomeini in Iran on February 1 of that year went ignored by markets - they rose .2% that day. These were both much greater events in US Iran relations, yet had little effect on markets. Though the Iran US tiff provides an explanation for the timing of the crash, my intuition tells me that because historical U.S.-Iran issues did not significantly affect markets, it was unlikely that an event of such small magnitude as the weekend clash could have caused trillions of dollars in market losses in a single day, and have influenced markets such as South Africa or Sweden, for instance, two countries unlikely to be affected by US-Iranian tensions.
The U.S. dollar had been declining against other currencies since early 1985. On the weekend of the crash, Treasury Secretary Baker made a statement in a television interview that the dollar should slip further, publicly criticizing the German government. This was taken as a sign that recent currency accords were crumbling. A volatile dollar discourages foreign investors, such as the Germans and the Japanese, because it does not allow them to make reasonable assumptions about the return on their investments in American securities. This theory has it that the threat of these investors pulling out caused the crash. The argument is attractive since it provides a good explanation for the timing of the crash, but is weak for two reasons. If Baker's words carried such causal power behind them, why did the U.S Major Currency Index only decline .69% the day of the crash? Why should the equity markets bear the brunt of statements that were really about currency markets? The small change in the U.S. dollar proves that Baker's statements did not carry much power, only marginally influenced equity markets, and that some other cause must have created the decline. The second weakness of the argument is that volatility in the U.S. currency implies repatriation of assets and strength somewhere else, Japan or Germany for instance. Yet both these markets, indeed all international markets declined that day. If Baker's statements had any power, then only the U.S market would have fallen with those in Germany and Japan rising.
Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter presented evidence in 1989 that the large decline in the U.S. market from October 14 through 16 was largely a rational reaction to an unanticipated tax proposal by the House Ways and Means Committee limiting the deductibility of interest expense on corporate debt, especially in takeovers. Between Tuesday, October 13, when the legislation was first introduced, and Friday, October 16, when the market closed for the weekend, stock prices fell more than 10 percent -- the largest 3-day drop in almost 50 years. In addition, those stocks that led the market downward were precisely those most affected by the legislation. This explanation certainly explains the temporal problem; why markets started to decline in mid-October. But why would a proposal concerning American markets affect prices in Australia and Hong Kong to a greater degree than in New York? Though a negative American reaction to proposed U.S. tax change might be rational to Mitchell and Netter, expecting us to believe that the remarkably negative response of non-U.S. markets to the same news event seems a stretch.
A collection of general economic conditions have been blamed for the crash. Interest rates in the U.S. had been rising since early 1987 as bond markets steadily deteriorated. Going into October 1987, some commentators believed high interest rates convinced investors to sell stocks, precipitating the crash. The U.S. twin deficits - the budget and trade deficits - had been steadily growing through the 1980's. On October 14, 1987, a large U.S trade deficit of 3.4% of GDP was announced. These two factors may have bred the decline in confidence necessary to knock markets down 23%. Shiller explains why these explanations come short: "Something must have been different On October 19, 1987 that caused the behaviour of the market to be very different from other days. What was different on that day? To answer that question, one must look for something that happened on exactly that day, not general considerations that characterize many days. Thus, for example, it is not enough to say that "portfolio insurance did it," since portfolio insurance has been around for years." Rising interest rates had been around for months, and excessive deficits had been around for years. These reasons cannot explain why markets would not have declined on August 5, or September 30. In other words, they fail to find what was different on October 19, 1987.
good article on why 87 may repeat itself....MAY, only MAY
Events and the Economy in 1987
It is very difficult to determine any specific events or economic conditions that markets may have been reacting to on October 19, 1987. Looking back at the crash from hindsight, many people have scoured through the flow of events prior to the decline to find a potential cause. What they have found is not very convincing - they seem to be reaching to the bottom of the bucket for justification. The events and changes in economic conditions were not earth-shattering. It is beyond the scope of logic to attribute a 22% decline in markets the world over to any of them.
In a question in his post-1987 survey, Robert Shiller asked: "Which of the following best describes your theory about the decline: a theory about investor psychology, or a theory about fundamentals such as profits or interest rates?" 67.5% of individual investors and 64% of institutional investors said the crash was about market psychology. It seems there is an unspoken consensus that the market decline was driven by psychology, though this is overshadowed by an accepted theory that events and program trading drove the decline. When Shiller asked what major events people in his survey were reacting to during the day of the crash, the most popular response was the price decline and the behaviour of others during the decline, not fundamental economic changes. Shiller concludes that there were two channels by which price declines fed back into further declines. "First, a price-to-price channel: investors on October 19 were reacting to price changes. Second, a social psychological channel: investors were directly reacting to each other." No events from the physical world are part of Shiller's conclusion. The price-to-price explanation explains why markets may have fallen as far and fast as they did, while the social psychological channel explains the international scope of the decline. These two explanations fail to account for why the crash occurred on October 19 and not any other day. Like the program trading argument, Shiller's psychological explanation is circular, requiring an initial price change to encourage further price changes. This origins of the initial price change are left unexplained. Still, Shiller's perspective explains more than most have been able to.
Let me now focus on some of the specific events that have been credited with sparking the crash. An ongoing spat between Iran and the U.S. had been playing itself out in 1987. The weekend of the crash, the U.S. attacked an Iranian offshore platform, reacting to an earlier Iran attack on American registered vessels in the Persian Gulf. Just because the attack was conveniently situated immediately prior to the crash in time does not mean it is a legitimate explanation. On January 16, 1979, the day the Shah fled Iran, the Dow decline only 1.5%. The arrival of Khomeini in Iran on February 1 of that year went ignored by markets - they rose .2% that day. These were both much greater events in US Iran relations, yet had little effect on markets. Though the Iran US tiff provides an explanation for the timing of the crash, my intuition tells me that because historical U.S.-Iran issues did not significantly affect markets, it was unlikely that an event of such small magnitude as the weekend clash could have caused trillions of dollars in market losses in a single day, and have influenced markets such as South Africa or Sweden, for instance, two countries unlikely to be affected by US-Iranian tensions.
The U.S. dollar had been declining against other currencies since early 1985. On the weekend of the crash, Treasury Secretary Baker made a statement in a television interview that the dollar should slip further, publicly criticizing the German government. This was taken as a sign that recent currency accords were crumbling. A volatile dollar discourages foreign investors, such as the Germans and the Japanese, because it does not allow them to make reasonable assumptions about the return on their investments in American securities. This theory has it that the threat of these investors pulling out caused the crash. The argument is attractive since it provides a good explanation for the timing of the crash, but is weak for two reasons. If Baker's words carried such causal power behind them, why did the U.S Major Currency Index only decline .69% the day of the crash? Why should the equity markets bear the brunt of statements that were really about currency markets? The small change in the U.S. dollar proves that Baker's statements did not carry much power, only marginally influenced equity markets, and that some other cause must have created the decline. The second weakness of the argument is that volatility in the U.S. currency implies repatriation of assets and strength somewhere else, Japan or Germany for instance. Yet both these markets, indeed all international markets declined that day. If Baker's statements had any power, then only the U.S market would have fallen with those in Germany and Japan rising.
Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter presented evidence in 1989 that the large decline in the U.S. market from October 14 through 16 was largely a rational reaction to an unanticipated tax proposal by the House Ways and Means Committee limiting the deductibility of interest expense on corporate debt, especially in takeovers. Between Tuesday, October 13, when the legislation was first introduced, and Friday, October 16, when the market closed for the weekend, stock prices fell more than 10 percent -- the largest 3-day drop in almost 50 years. In addition, those stocks that led the market downward were precisely those most affected by the legislation. This explanation certainly explains the temporal problem; why markets started to decline in mid-October. But why would a proposal concerning American markets affect prices in Australia and Hong Kong to a greater degree than in New York? Though a negative American reaction to proposed U.S. tax change might be rational to Mitchell and Netter, expecting us to believe that the remarkably negative response of non-U.S. markets to the same news event seems a stretch.
A collection of general economic conditions have been blamed for the crash. Interest rates in the U.S. had been rising since early 1987 as bond markets steadily deteriorated. Going into October 1987, some commentators believed high interest rates convinced investors to sell stocks, precipitating the crash. The U.S. twin deficits - the budget and trade deficits - had been steadily growing through the 1980's. On October 14, 1987, a large U.S trade deficit of 3.4% of GDP was announced. These two factors may have bred the decline in confidence necessary to knock markets down 23%. Shiller explains why these explanations come short: "Something must have been different On October 19, 1987 that caused the behaviour of the market to be very different from other days. What was different on that day? To answer that question, one must look for something that happened on exactly that day, not general considerations that characterize many days. Thus, for example, it is not enough to say that "portfolio insurance did it," since portfolio insurance has been around for years." Rising interest rates had been around for months, and excessive deficits had been around for years. These reasons cannot explain why markets would not have declined on August 5, or September 30. In other words, they fail to find what was different on October 19, 1987.
Spaf
Honorary Hall of Fame Member
imported post
The Kingdom of TSP
Daily
Market Weather, Doodles, Tea Leaves & Yak Date April 26 Closing
Market Weather.
Weather: Monsonn thunderstorm douses market.
Musketeers in weak confidence retreat from Horsemen in field when challenged by earnings.
Additionally, Squirrels could not crack resistance nut on tree #1163. Squirrels scampered to tool shed looking for a big hammer.
At market lube slid some more -0.37 to $54.20 a bucket.
Doodles and Tea Leaves.
Doodles: S&P at 1151, dn -10.96
CMF money flow at -0.613, rising.
RSI strength at 42.5, down.
MACD moving averages at -9.51 rising / bearish.
Tea Leaves: brown with red and green spots. Yuck!!
Yak.
Remarks: Holding 50/50. Ordered more air sick bags!
The Kingdom of TSP
Daily
Market Weather, Doodles, Tea Leaves & Yak Date April 26 Closing
Market Weather.
Weather: Monsonn thunderstorm douses market.
Musketeers in weak confidence retreat from Horsemen in field when challenged by earnings.
Additionally, Squirrels could not crack resistance nut on tree #1163. Squirrels scampered to tool shed looking for a big hammer.
At market lube slid some more -0.37 to $54.20 a bucket.
Doodles and Tea Leaves.
Doodles: S&P at 1151, dn -10.96
CMF money flow at -0.613, rising.
RSI strength at 42.5, down.
MACD moving averages at -9.51 rising / bearish.
Tea Leaves: brown with red and green spots. Yuck!!
Yak.
Remarks: Holding 50/50. Ordered more air sick bags!
Spaf
Honorary Hall of Fame Member
imported post
The current market is somewhat unstable. However a decision is normally made when a double bottom is reached. Normally this is a transition pattern thatoften leads to profitable trading opportunities. The entry criteria is when stocks break above the mid point between the two troughs, called the pivot point.
Caution. If stock falls below the lowest low on the W it's time to exit. If prices hold near or just below the left-side trough, and volume confirms the reversal, a buy position can be made.
Attachment: S&P Chart with notes.
Rgds! And be careful! Spaf
The current market is somewhat unstable. However a decision is normally made when a double bottom is reached. Normally this is a transition pattern thatoften leads to profitable trading opportunities. The entry criteria is when stocks break above the mid point between the two troughs, called the pivot point.
Caution. If stock falls below the lowest low on the W it's time to exit. If prices hold near or just below the left-side trough, and volume confirms the reversal, a buy position can be made.
Attachment: S&P Chart with notes.
Rgds! And be careful!
Spaf
teknobucks
Active member
imported post
mortgage rates:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aiPmFtJoEwrg&refer=us
mortgage rates:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aiPmFtJoEwrg&refer=us
teknobucks
Active member
imported post
do not buy list:
http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/us/2005-04-25-energey-usat_x.htm
do not buy list:
http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/us/2005-04-25-energey-usat_x.htm
teknobucks
Active member
imported post
[size=+2]The ECONO-MATRIX[/size]
http://www.321gold.com/editorials/wallenwein/wallenwein042605.html
and a nice chart with more jibberish...LOL:
http://www.investorshub.com/boards/read_msg.asp?message_id=6162031
are we in a shake out zONe?:
US Investor Optimism Lowest Since May '03
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20050425/bs_nm/markets_stocks_investor_dc
lmao....and what happened after May 2003.....roflmao
tekno
[size=+2]The ECONO-MATRIX[/size]
http://www.321gold.com/editorials/wallenwein/wallenwein042605.html
and a nice chart with more jibberish...LOL:
http://www.investorshub.com/boards/read_msg.asp?message_id=6162031
are we in a shake out zONe?:
US Investor Optimism Lowest Since May '03
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20050425/bs_nm/markets_stocks_investor_dc
lmao....and what happened after May 2003.....roflmao
tekno
The_Technician
Active member
imported post
I like that Elliott wave there Teckno.......seems my data and your chart agree on a date or thereabouts.....5/6/2005.....and a down trend to 1100 or lower....
Now I'm going to literally give you the 6th degree....
Since you know Elliott trend analysis.....can you tell me what this equation has to do with the current stock market.........
y = 3E-17x6 - 8E-12x5 + 8E-07x4 - 0.0396x3 + 1145.7x2 - 2E+07x + 1E+11
I'm still looking for that knife coming down.....
The Technician
I like that Elliott wave there Teckno.......seems my data and your chart agree on a date or thereabouts.....5/6/2005.....and a down trend to 1100 or lower....
Now I'm going to literally give you the 6th degree....
Since you know Elliott trend analysis.....can you tell me what this equation has to do with the current stock market.........
y = 3E-17x6 - 8E-12x5 + 8E-07x4 - 0.0396x3 + 1145.7x2 - 2E+07x + 1E+11
I'm still looking for that knife coming down.....
The Technician
imported post
Oh, ok. Took me some time and the rest of you proably had it figured out already. When you post something, PLEASE, PLEASE, doNOT BLOW UP THE FONT. When you do you create the long text boxes. This makes it harder to read the other messages. If people want to have a bigger graph to read- they can copy and put it on there computer and make it as big as they like. It makes this sight easier to read. Just my two cents. Thanks.
Oh, ok. Took me some time and the rest of you proably had it figured out already. When you post something, PLEASE, PLEASE, doNOT BLOW UP THE FONT. When you do you create the long text boxes. This makes it harder to read the other messages. If people want to have a bigger graph to read- they can copy and put it on there computer and make it as big as they like. It makes this sight easier to read. Just my two cents. Thanks.
The_Technician
Active member
imported post
Hmmm, I think its about time for another educated guess on some dates when things might be happening..... as you recall, I caution you guys to make up your minds last week on getting out of the market.....:?
This week and the first two weeks of May looks very muddy.....lots of jigging may be going on here.....very very high risk being in the market.....:shock:
Looking for something drastic around 14th May......:shock:we'll get that bottom Tom talks so much of......only thing is.....it looks like its further down a cliff!!!! I guess you won't like too much ehhhh Tom.......
Of course this is an educated guess......never can say 100% sure....you never really know....but I have been pretty accurate lately....
I'm licking my chops as if I had been eating some good ole ribs off the BarB.....but temptation is the Devils work! :s I might get in for one day here soon.....only if it looks like the sharks took a break!!!
The Technician:dude:
Hmmm, I think its about time for another educated guess on some dates when things might be happening.....
as you recall, I caution you guys to make up your minds last week on getting out of the market.....:?This week and the first two weeks of May looks very muddy.....lots of jigging may be going on here.....very very high risk being in the market.....:shock:
Looking for something drastic around 14th May......:shock:we'll get that bottom Tom talks so much of......only thing is.....it looks like its further down a cliff!!!! I guess you won't like too much ehhhh Tom.......
Of course this is an educated guess......never can say 100% sure....you never really know....but I have been pretty accurate lately....
I'm licking my chops as if I had been eating some good ole ribs off the BarB.....but temptation is the Devils work! :s I might get in for one day here soon.....only if it looks like the sharks took a break!!!
The Technician:dude:
pyriel
Active member
imported post
teknobucks wrote:
Pyriel
teknobucks wrote:
Hmmm.. Tekno, the author missed what I think is very significant piece in 1987 which is the tax reform act. I'm not sure if anyone is aware but there was a bust in real estate within that timeframe. Why? Congress took away the many important deductions that many people used to have. Before 1987, people were actually owning real estate to lose money and using that to deduct the lost in their income tax. Many middle income and rich people lost out big on this. As people started selling their properties, they flooded the market and caused a bubble.What happened next is a panic and along with the other things that were mentioned, you had your crash of 1987. Just my .02.
Pyriel
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