December 27, 2007
Memorandum for the Executive Director
From: Tracey Ray
Subject: Frequent Trading Curbs
As a result of my research for the Board on this subject matter, I reported that “most large mutual fund families adopted some type of trading restrictions, particularly on international funds.” My November 6, 2007, memorandum described trading restrictions at 13 specific large mutual funds. Those limits flow through to the 401(k) and other participant directed defined contribution retirement plans which invest in those funds.
I further reported that “some fund companies have elected to curb frequent trading by creating...redemption fees” and described funds which charge up to 2 percent on shares redeemed within 30, 60, or 90 days of purchase. I specifically cited the International Index Fund offered by T. Rowe Price which charges a 2 percent redemption fee on shares held less than 90 days.
At our December 19, 2007, meeting with the Employee Thrift Advisory Council (ETAC), I presented the same report to Council members. We also provided descriptions of the interfund transfer limits implemented by 40 retirement plans which use the same record keeping system as the TSP.
During the meeting, ETAC Chairman Jim Sauber and others asked about the possibility of allowing 3 interfund transfers (IFTs) per month instead of 2. Our goal in proposing 2 IFTs per month is to reduce the dollar amount of the trade to as low a number as possible while still allowing participants the flexibility to rebalance their accounts. Our analysis shows that 3 IFTs would reduce trade volume by approximately 25%, while 2 IFTs would reduce it by approximately 50%.
Also during the meeting, the NTEU representative, Cathy Ball, advised the group that TIAA-CREF has established a policy whereby participants are allowed some number of “free” interfund transfers per month and are charged a fee for additional transfers thereafter. Ms. Ball’s point was that such a system would give TSP participants more flexibility than the FRTIB proposal.
After the meeting, Ms. Ball arranged for me to talk to her contact at TIAA-CREF (Brett Hammond, Head of Investment Strategy) regarding its methodology for curbing frequent trading. I also reviewed information on other offerings at the TIAA-CREF website.
In my discussion with Mr. Hammond, and from a review of the most recent prospectus for TIAA-CREF’s Institutional Mutual Funds, I learned that current policy at TIAA-CREF is to charge a redemption fee of 2 percent if a participant redeems International Equity, International Equity Index, High Yield II, Small-Cap Equity, Small-Cap Growth Index, Small-Cap Value Index or Small-Cap Blend Index Fund shares within 60 days of purchasing them. This is no different from the fee-based examples cited in my memorandum. I also learned that TIAA-CREF went to the fee structure only after trading restrictions it initially established did not work as desired.
TIAA-CREF had established a policy of allowing 12 exchanges in 12 months, except for the international and high yield funds where the limit was 6 exchanges in a 12 month period. Those initial restrictions on the international funds did not achieve the desired result. The trading restrictions resulted in fund transfer requests “bunching up” at times of extreme market volatility. TIAA-CREF sought to end that behavior and instituted the redemption fees in addition to trading restrictions. TIAA-CREF’s experience illustrates why we proposed allowing 2 IFTs per month rather than 24 per year.
I note that TIAA-CREF preferred trading restrictions over fees until it found that its restrictions did not work because of the arbitrage opportunity presented by its international fund policy. We also prefer trading restrictions, with subsequent free movement into the G Fund, over fees.
The TIAA-CREF website does not describe any TIAA-CREF offerings which first establish a limit on interfund transfers and then allow further fee-based transfers. My industry research has also not identified any retirement plans or funds which allow limited free interfund transfers which may then be augmented by fee-based transfers.
If we followed TIAA-CREF’s policy of charging a redemption fee of 2 percent for shares held less than 60 days, we would:
(1) deny our participants the ability to go to the G Fund at any time for no charge. The Board considers that capability to be of paramount importance.
(2) limit our participants to rebalancing every 2 months (to avoid the fee) versus every 2 weeks.
(3) punish an infrequent trader who may wish to redeem within 60 days because the market is declining. In this situation, the participant would lose 2 percent in addition to the market decline, a worst case scenario.
When TIAA-CREF instituted the fees, it also modified its trading restriction policy to the following:
A participant who transfers from any fund, transfers back, and then sells it within 60 days may not repurchase that fund for 90 days. AND, if the transaction involved the international, high yield, or small-cap funds, a 2% fee would be assessed.
Under our approach:
In one month a participant can transfer out of the C Fund, transfer back, and then switch into the G Fund. Our participant could also transfer back to the C Fund on the first business day of the next calendar month (less than 30 days later).
I asked Mr. Hammond about our proposal to allow 2 interfund transfers each month followed by unlimited transfers into the G Fund. He said, in his opinion, our proposal was more liberal than the TIAA-CREF policies.
I have learned that on certain mutual funds, including all of its international index funds, Vanguard follows a policy similar to TIAA-CREF’s by charging redemption fees and restricting trading. For example, the Vanguard Developed Markets Index Fund (similar to the TSP I Fund) charges a 2 percent redemption fee on shares held less than 2 months in addition to its trade restriction policy. Thus a fund holder pays a fee and still cannot repurchase shares in a fund for 60 days after a redemption in that fund. This is obviously designed as a double-barrelled deterrent to frequent trading, and is not comparable to a policy which deters frequent trading via limits but then allows augmentation for a fee.
Conclusion
In my further research since completing my November 2007 memorandum, I have neither seen nor learned of any new information that would change my recommendation. Indeed, the most recent survey finding by Hewitt (Trends and Experience in 401(k) Plans 2007) found that “nearly three quarters of plan sponsors have transfer restrictions in place.” The use of redemption fees appears to be minimal with only two percent of survey respondents indicating any charge whatsoever for fund transfers. There is no mention at all in the survey of plans which allow a certain number of fund transfers and then permit augmentation for those willing to pay a fee.
I look forward to receiving more input from interested parties as we work through the regulatory process..