Arizona Immigration law

[Steadygain]

For some California grass!

Very good !!!


Now all of us just need to chill :toung: and kind of float with that

Yes Minnow -- VLM -- everybody ....


breathe in silk ..... blow out bubbles..

 

[Minnow]

Very good !!!


Now all of us just need to chill and kind of float with that

Yes Minnow -- VLM -- everybody ....


breathe in silk ..... blow out bubbles..

OK... side of the road buddy ... got too much of that whacky weed did ya? Wanna know why I pulled you over? You were goin' 7!!! 7 miles per hour in the fast lane!!!

 

[Frixxxx]

OK... side of the road buddy ... got too much of that whacky weed did ya? Wanna know why I pulled you over? You were goin' 7!!! 7 miles per hour in the fast lane!!!

There is NO fast lane in California.....Got me a 72 in a 65 ticket going around a guy in the "fast lane". I asked the cop why the guy in the "fast lane" wasn't at fault for doing 55, he responded, "No fast lane in California, sonny!" But interesting enough, if you get a ticket in California, you can go to traffic school and they won't record it against your license as points.....course this only works once in a year!

 

[James48843]

This thread is going to the dogs, fast.

View attachment 9189​

 

[James48843]

Q: "Do you know why I am pulling you over?"

Answer (ALWAYS): "No Sir,(or Mam), I have no idea why. Under suspicion of what crime am I being detained”?


“What is your reasonable suspicion?”

Am I free to go now? "

 

[Minnow]

There is NO fast lane in California.....Got me a 72 in a 65 ticket going around a guy in the "fast lane". I asked the cop why the guy in the "fast lane" wasn't at fault for doing 55, he responded, "No fast lane in California, sonny!" But interesting enough, if you get a ticket in California, you can go to traffic school and they won't record it against your license as points.....course this only works once in a year!

I've driven in and through LA. I wasn't aware that you could actually go even as high as 55 there. They call them parkways for a reason.

Maybe we should start a road rage thread for just the Californians. -- The true reason they want pot legal.

 

[Minnow]

Q: "Do you know why I am pulling you over?"

Answer (ALWAYS): "No Sir,(or Mam), I have no idea why. Under suspicion of what crime am I being detained”?


“What is your reasonable suspicion?”

Am I free to go now? "

You get that from a jailhouse lawyer? :laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh:

 

[alevin]

Alevin (or spanish minnow ) ...

Minnow, I always knew we were 5th cousins. Welcome to the family! :nuts:


As far as what Lady said, for most every traffic stop (other encounters differ a bit), she's pretty much right. Traffic infraction allows the stop (expired tags, no signal, unable to maintain your lane, etc.) therefore, the cop is allowed to question.

Yup, why I said what I said to CB earlier.

 

[James48843]

You get that from a jailhouse lawyer? :laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh:

No.

From Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer dissenting in Hiibel vs. Nevada. And Justice Kenndey's response to Justice Breyer's dissent.



http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/24/dorf.police.id/

 

[Minnow]

No.

From Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer dissenting in Hiibel vs. Nevada. And Justice Kenndey's response to Justice Breyer's dissent.



http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/24/dorf.police.id/

red and bold for emphasis.

follow James' advice at your own risk.

 

[James48843]

You can read the whole case, with opinions, here:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-5554.ZS.html

Stops, ID's, requirements, reasonable suspecion, and probable cause have all been previously addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Several laws have been tossed out in the past.

That's all.

 

[James48843]

Dissent is a valuable tool- because it clearly gives guidence on what that Justice would find un-constitutional in another circumstance.

And the text of the majority decision is equally important- as it is here:

(a) State stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. They vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 167—171, this Court invalidated a traditional vagrancy law for vagueness because of its broad scope and imprecise terms. The Court recognized similar constitutional limitations in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, where it invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds, and in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, where it invalidated on vagueness grounds California’s modified stop and identify statute that required a suspect to give an officer “credible and reliable ” identification when asked to identify himself, id., at 360. This case begins where those cases left off. Here, the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, Hiibel has not alleged that the Nevada statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. This statute is narrower and more precise. In contrast to the “credible and reliable” identification requirement in Kolender, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect disclose his name. It apparently does not require him to produce a driver’s license or any other document. If he chooses either to state his name or communicate it to the officer by other means, the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. Pp. 3—6.
(b) The officer’s conduct did not violate Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment rights. Ordinarily, an investigating officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Amendment. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, the Court has recognized that an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop, see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3. The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. Terry, supra, at 34. The Nevada statute is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures because it properly balances the intrusion on the individual’s interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654. An identity request has an immediate relation to the Terry stop’s purpose, rationale, and practical demands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself, changing neither its duration nor its location. Hiibel argues unpersuasively that the statute circumvents the probable-cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious, thereby creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary police conduct. These familiar concerns underlay Kolender, Brown, and Papachristou. They are met by the requirement that a Terry stop be justified at its inception and be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” the initial stop. Terry, 392 U.S., at 20. Under those principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817. The request in this case was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s requirement of a response did not contravene the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 6—10.
(c) Hiibel’s contention that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on self-incrimination fails because disclosure of his name and identity presented no reasonable danger of incrimination. The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating, see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598, and protects only against disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445. Hiibel’s refusal to disclose was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish evidence needed to prosecute him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486. It appears he refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer’s business. While the Court recognizes his strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him. Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555. If a case arises where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense, the court can then consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applies, whether it has been violated, and what remedy must follow. Those questions need not be resolved here. 10—13.

 

[Minnow]

You can read the whole case, with opinions, here:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-5554.ZS.html

Stops, ID's, requirements, reasonable suspecion, and probable cause have all been previously addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Several laws have been tossed out in the past.

That's all.

If your "you" meant me, then no thanks... been there, read them, studied them, passed written and practical tests on them, been to court on them, and live them every day of my professional life.

If your "you" meant others not so acquainted with the law then sure, go ahead and reach your own conclusions.

 

[James48843]

from the Majority Opinion in Hiibel:

The Court has recognized similar constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity. See id., at 51—52. Absent that factual basis for detaining the defendant, the Court held, the risk of “arbitrary and abusive police practices” was too great and the stop was impermissible. Id., at 52. Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). The California law in Kolender required a suspect to give an officer “ ‘credible and reliable’ ” identification when asked to identify himself. Id., at 360. The Court held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in “ ‘virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.’ ” Id., at 360 (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result)).
The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, the petitioner has not alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more precise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to require a suspect to give the officer “credible and reliable” identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted NRS §171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his name. See 118 Nev., at ___, 59 P.3d, at 1206 (opinion of Young, C. J.) (“The suspect is not required to provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion exists”). As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means–a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make–the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. See id., at ___, 59 P.3d, at 1206—1207.

 

[Minnow]

Dissent is a valuable tool- because it clearly gives guidence on what that Justice would find un-constitutional in another circumstance.

And the text of the majority decision is equally important- as it is here:

This supports my point of view, not yours.

 

[James48843]

Just saying- there is a clear body of law in this area already- that all you need to do is tell them who you are. The part about being detained for failing to providing a birth certificate or proof of citizenship, is far beyond what has been litigated before.

And this Arizona law will provide, I'm sure, some interesting cases ahead.

As for me- No, I don't know why you are stopping me. Under suspicion of what crime am I being detained?

And am I free to go now?

 

[Viva_La_Migra]

Dissent is a valuable tool- because it clearly gives guidence on what that Justice would find un-constitutional in another circumstance.

And the text of the majority decision is equally important- as it is here:

Dissent is a valuable tool, but it is not precedent setting. It is the majority decision that is more important, because it sets precedent.

 

[James48843]

This supports my point of view, not yours.

here-

If a case arises where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense, the court can then consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applies, whether it has been violated, and what remedy must follow. Those questions need not be resolved here. 10—13.

It's clear from the Arizona law discussion, that if one fails to provide proof of citizenship on the stop, they can be arrested.

It is clear from the decision in Hiibel, that Hiibel left open the door on Fifth, as well as Fourth Amendment grounds- that if providing your identity will result in your being charged with a crime (like border crossing illegally), that you may still have the right to remain silent, and not answer the question. THAT is what becomes new fertile ground for the Surpeme Court in this new law.

We'll see.

 

[Viva_La_Migra]

Just saying- there is a clear body of law in this area already- that all you need to do is tell them who you are. The part about being detained for failing to providing a birth certificate or proof of citizenship, is far beyond what has been litigated before.

And this Arizona law will provide, I'm sure, some interesting cases ahead.

As for me- No, I don't know why you are stopping me. Under suspicion of what crime am I being detained?

And am I free to go now?

Next time you get pulled over, say that to the cop and let us know how that works out for you. Just don't call me to post your bond.

 

[Minnow]

Just saying- there is a clear body of law in this area already- that all you need to do is tell them who you are. The part about being detained for failing to providing a birth certificate or proof of citizenship, is far beyond what has been litigated before.

And this Arizona law will provide, I'm sure, some interesting cases ahead.

As for me- No, I don't know why you are stopping me. Under suspicion of what crime am I being detained?

And am I free to go now?

Just a friendly bit of advice. Do not try that. Good way to move up to getting a ticket instead of a warning.

Read the AZ law. Doesn't say anything about having to carry a birth certificate. Read VLM's earlier post... interstate travel, all you need is to comply with "license, registration and (sometimes) proof of insurance." nothing has changed. (you do need passport for border crossing now -- mostly).