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3) Options Arm and Alt A. Loan Programs: The third leg of the trifecta issues gaining momentum is something I wrote about concerning the conversion of payment structures on Option ARMs and Alt. A. loan programs. Below is a chart of when they begin to convert and by home much.
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Beginning in the 4th quarter of 2009 and going well into 2011, we'll see a sharp increase in the number of homes receiving adjustments on mortgage payments, and by a wide margin (40-80% increases). Many of those mortgages where written as a way for someone to buy a house they couldn't afford on traditional home financing terms, and when the payment adjusts they will not be able to afford that home.
If you can't afford the mortgage payment, and the house is worth less than what's owed, it's not rocket science, it's just a matter of when the bank gets to own it. The re-pricing of mortgages should cause another wave of bank owned homes and more financially distressed real estate. This sub-segment problem might take until the end of 2010 to actually hit bank balance sheets (as real estate owned by the bank) given the timing of the payment change and foreclosing process of properties.
One of the more interesting notes about these exotic mortgages is it seems like they were highly concentrated in the higher end real estate markets. As a commercial banker, I see a lot of people who have these types of mortgages on higher end homes. In California I see these types of mortgages on loans typically $700,000 or higher. So, as the mortgage re-pricing occurs we might see this problem concentrated in the higher end real estate markets, as those assets flow into bank owned and then back onto the market as distressed real estate, we should expect compression in real estate values from the top down.
Another unique note is that slightly more than 50% of these types of mortgages were underwritten in California, so the intensity of the problem should be felt in California, "The Bubble State". If so, it should negatively impact CA real estate values and those banks specializing in this lending product in California. Hmmm, I can't remember, but who bought Wachovia?
http://www.safehaven.com/article-14795.htm
We're not only seeing lenders work through the pent-up foreclosure inventory, we're also seeing foreclosures move to the higher end of the market. In the early stages of the downturn, subprime mortgages were the hardest hit, but now we're seeing more and more foreclosures among prime mortgages, as well as Alt-A and Option ARMs. In 2006, about 55 percent of foreclosures were on subprime loans; in 2009, subprimes represent just 35 percent of foreclosures, while another 35 percent are in the middle tier and 30 percent are in the top tier.
According to the Amherst Security Group, this problem won't go away any time soon, because:
• Loans are transitioning into delinquency/foreclosure at a rapid pace, but moving out at a slow pace;
• Cure rates are low. In other words, fewer people are paying their past-due amounts and getting back on track.
• Loans are taking longer to liquidate. In other words, the length of time between the start of the foreclosure process and the point when the lender gets control of the property is growing.
Here’s a sobering thought for those excited by recent signs that the housing market may be bottoming out: Homeowners who fall behind on their mortgage payments have become much less likely to catch up again.
The report from Fitch Ratings Ltd., a credit rating firm, focuses on a plunge in the “cure rate” for mortgages that were packaged into securities for sale to investors. The study excludes loans that are guaranteed by government-backed agencies as well as those that were never bundled into securities. The cure rate is the percentage of delinquent loans that return to current payment status each month.
Fitch found that the cure rate for prime loans dropped to 6.6% as of July from an average of 45% for the years 2000 through 2006. For Alt-A loans—a category between prime and subprime that typically involves borrowers who don’t fully document their income or assets—the cure rate has fallen to 4.3% from 30.2%. For subprime, the rate has declined to 5.3% from 19.4%.
“The cure rates have really collapsed,” said Roelof Slump, a managing director at Fitch.
Because borrowers are less willing or able to catch up on payments, foreclosures are likely to remain a big problem. Barclays Capital projects that the number of foreclosed homes for sale will peak at 1.15 million in mid-2010, up from an estimated 688,000 as of July 1.
Cure rates have plunged despite the Obama administration’s prodding of banks to ease the terms of mortgages for millions of borrowers to try to prevent foreclosures. Without those loan-modification efforts, the cure rates would be even lower.
Borrowers have become less likely to catch up partly because job losses have made some of them unable to make payments, Mr. Slump said. In addition, he said, some people who could make the payments probably are no longer willing to do so. That may be because the values of their homes have fallen below their loan balances and they see little hope of ever recovering their initial investments.
The long recession and rising joblessness are taking an increasing toll on the nation's most credit-worthy borrowers, who are now falling behind on their mortgage and credit-card payments at a faster pace than people with poor financial histories.
The mortgage-delinquency rate among so-called subprime borrowers reached 25% in the first quarter but appears to be leveling off, rising only slightly in the second quarter. The pace of delinquencies for prime borrowers is accelerating. Since prime loans account for 80% of U.S. bank exposure to mortgages and credit cards, these losses could ultimately exceed those from weaker borrowers.
The titans that survived last year's tumult have gathered deposits by the bushel. But they have shown less of a knack for lending it out.
A river of cash has flowed into the biggest banks over the past year. But for borrowers, it has been more of a meandering stream.
Deposits at the top five bank holding companies soared 29 percent in the year ended June 30, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
All told, the five biggest deposit-taking banks added $852 billion in core deposits over the past year -- essentially checking and savings accounts of less than $100,000.
Over the same period, their loan portfolios rose by just $564 billion.
This is noteworthy because these five banks received more than $100 billion in direct taxpayer assistance via the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) -- a program that was set up to replenish the depleted capital levels of banks and allow them to boost lending to consumers and small businesses.
Federal Reserve governor Daniel Tarullo told Congress this month that commercial bank lending has declined through most of 2009, "with particularly severe consequences for small- and medium-sized businesses, which are much more dependent on banks than on the public capital markets that can be accessed by larger corporations."
I think you hit the nail on the head Show-me, makes sense to me. The deck is stacked and the little guys haven't got a chance, as usual.:worried:This is a perfect set up if you think like me. The mega banks have staked out the permanent claim in the banking industry by absorbing the failures, taking TARP, and increasing their balance sheet while not lending any money out.
I am hearing too many back stories about how the regional and small banks are on the verge of collapse because credit is so tight or nonexistent.
Who got the tax payer help and who is hording the cash? Who became too big to fail? Why?
First the mega banks have to stave off the next wave of loan failures. After that they will be in prime position to scoop up regional and small banks on the cheap, making them bigger yet just like the big three automakers and the oil companies. When that is done the world will be their oyster just like the oil companies. If you want to make the big bucks own all the competition.
Am I cynical, nuts, or realistic?