Do auto workers really earn $73 an hour?

http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_021809/content/01125111.guest.html

Automakers Must Regain Swagger and Sell Cars That Americans Want
February 18, 2009
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/Rush247.guest.html

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RUSH: The automobile companies are next in line with their hands out. General Motors and Chrysler are asking for, what is it, the number being bandied about is $16 billion for General Motors, but I've seen a total of 30 mentioned elsewhere. Let me find it here in the stack. Yeah, GM needs up to $30 billion. Yes, and, by the way, we've got official news, both Obama and the Congress are calling for a second stimulus package. I'll have the details in just a second. First I want to tell you about the automobile dealers. "General Motors Corp said on Tuesday it could need a total of up to $30 billion in U.S. government aid -- more than doubling its original aid -- and would run out of cash as soon as March without new federal funding." Now, GM and Chrysler, back in the fall, said they would run out of cash when, if they didn't get the first bailout? January or something like that? My point is, regardless how much money they're given, at some point they're going to run out. The focal point here is that people need to buy cars. If General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, if they're going to rebound, people need to buy their cars.

"The request for additional aid from the top U.S. automaker came in a restructuring plan GM submitted to U.S. officials on Tuesday. The GM restructuring plan of more than 100 pages was posted on the U.S. Treasury website." Now, here's the dilemma about this. The first thing you have to understand, these automobile dealers are located in Michigan. There are no jobs in Michigan. So here's the question. Do we the taxpayers bail out the auto companies, which is essentially bailing out the unions, I mean when you strip it down to bare facts, we are talking about bailing out employees, or not bailing out employees. If we bail out the car companies, the theory is that at least their people will be employed in the state of Michigan, where there are no jobs. And then General Motors and Chrysler can go about continuing to try to make cars that people want to buy, theoretically. Or, we don't bail 'em out and they run out of money and they have to file capital 11 or just plain go out of business, at which case all the autoworkers are unemployed and you know what will happen then. We will subsidize their unemployment with unemployment benefits.

Now, we will not subsidize their unemployment at their current salaries, their annual salaries and benefits and all that. But that's the dilemma, and there's a third option here. Filing Chapter 11, which the automobile companies say they don't want to do because people aren't going to buy anything made by a company in bankruptcy, the question has to be asked, are they buying anything now? Are they buying enough product from Ford, General Motor, and Chrysler, to stave off any crisis that they're facing? It doesn't appear so because they keep coming back and asking for more money. So if we let 'em go Chapter 11, they can reorganize and at least start to run the company, reorganize in a way that they can run responsibly. That would put the unions out and this is all about saving the unions. I want to prepare you for the argument, "Well, we've gotta protect these jobs." There are no jobs in Michigan. So if the auto companies go belly up, if they go out of business, all these union workers, the United Auto Workers employees, the subsidiaries, where are they going to go to get work? They won't and that's bad for all of us, it's bad for the economy, so the pressure to continue to provide bailout money for the autoworkers is going to be to keep people employed because that helps all of us.

Now, I want to make one last comment on all of this and then I'm going to get off of this because it really bothers me. A business plan that focuses on cuts and reductions only, which is what we're dealing with, I mean, they're gonna cut Saturn, they're gonna eliminate Saturn, they're gonna basically have four brands with Pontiac as a special order. Going to do Buick, GMC, Cadillac, and Chevrolet, get rid of Saturn and so forth, they're going to keep the Hummer. They're going to get rid of the small cars that Saturn makes. A business plan that focuses on cuts and reductions, I mean, it must be done, obviously, but it frightens me a little bit. Bankers and creditors are an important part of any budget going forward, but so are customers. A business has to be relentless in how it markets itself. It's always talking to its customers, its future customers, it's always building confidence in the future, and not just by promising cutbacks. Right now, the auto companies are not even concerned about talking primarily to customers. They are concerned with persuading Washington. The automobile companies are forced into a situation here where they have to sell whatever they have to sell, and it isn't cars in this case, to Washington.

Governments are better by being smaller. Private companies are at their best when they're expanding, efficient spending is supposed to be a given. A business plan does not exist in a vacuum, is my point. Customers are going to watch how this is marketed as closely as how the cars are marketed. See, the thing is, we all want General Motors to succeed. General Motors is a legacy in this country. It's a tradition. We want Ford to succeed, Chrysler. We want these companies to succeed. They say they can't take bankruptcy because some studies indicate people won't buy cars from a bankrupt company. Now, I think that if a company can tell the world why they have never been more excited about the future post-bankruptcy, they can inspire confidence. Trump understands this. Trump, regardless what's going on, is always confident, he's always positive, he is enthusiastic, and you have to be. That's part of the job. Selling is always part of the job. The car companies have lost their swagger. I wish they could get it back. The American people want to support General Motors and Ford and Chrysler. The American people are rooting for those companies. But we want to feel like we're rooting for people who refuse to fail.

We want people to lead, who are fearless, promise to make products we'll absolutely fall in love with. That's not going to happen as long as these companies are cowering in the corner in fear of Congress. The American people want to see courage; they want to see leadership, independence. We want to see out of those executives exactly what we want out of the cars that they are selling. I see a totally defensive, negative posture, and who can blame 'em. They're totally prisoners now to Washington. What's happening to the automobile companies is a microcosm of what's going to happen to anybody who becomes totally dependent on Washington, when you live in constant fear. You can't make a move without their approval. They don't know what to approve or what not to approve because they're not experts and their motivation for approving things is going to be based on satisfying constituencies that have nothing to do with selling cars. This is a vicious cycle.

Cessna, on the other hand, set the standard. Here is an industry that's under assault by the federal government, the Cessna CEO runs a full-page ad telling CEOs to buck up, to grow a pair, in essence, and remember what it was like to dream big things. That's how you market yourself, boldness, strength, independence, be your product. You got a car that goes zero to 60 in 4.5 seconds, be an executive that can do it, too.
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RUSH:

Cessna, on the other hand, set the standard. Here is an industry that's under assault by the federal government, the Cessna CEO runs a full-page ad telling CEOs to buck up, to grow a pair, in essence, and remember what it was like to dream big things. That's how you market yourself, boldness, strength, independence, be your product. You got a car that goes zero to 60 in 4.5 seconds, be an executive that can do it, too.
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"Cessna CEO runs a full-page ad telling CEOs to buck up, to grow a pair, in essence, and remember what it was like to dream big things".

Cessna CEO Jack Pelton recognizes that his customer base is cancelling their jet orders. Of course Jack will run a full page ad telling his customers to thumb their noses at everyone, and go ahead and buy a Cessna. What else would you expect him to do?


http://www.flyingmag.com/news/1350/cessna-hawker-beechcraft-announce-new-rounds-of-layoffs.html


Cessna Wichita:
Cessna, Hawker Beechcraft Announce New Rounds of Layoffs

By Mark Phelps
2/6/2009
The general aviation manufacturing segment continues to be pummeled by the current economic crisis. Last week, Cessna announced another 2,000 pink slips will be distributed, bringing the total to 4,600 since the country's financial downturn began. Most of the new layoffs will be in Wichita. Cessna has suffered mightily from canceled orders, with a reported $64 million drop in fourth-quarter 2008 revenues compared with the same period in 2007. Across town, Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (HBC) announced an additional 2,300 layoffs are imminent, adding to the 490 job losses announced earlier. The new layoffs represent a quarter of HBC's overall workforce.
 
At a recent computer expo (COMDEX),Bill Gates reportedly compared the computer industry with the auto industry and stated, “If GM had kept up with technology like the computer industry has, we would all be driving $25 cars that got 1,000 miles to the gallon.”


In response to Bill's comments, General Motors issued a press release stating:

If GM had developed technology like Microsoft, we would all be driving cars with the following characteristics:

1. For no reason whatsoever, your car would crash........
twice a day.

2. Every time they repainted the lines in the road, you would have to buy a new car.

3. Occasionally your car would die on the freeway for no reason. You would have to pull to the side of the road, close all of the windows, shut off the car, restart it, and reopen the windows before you could continue. For some reason you would simply accept this.

4. Occasionally, executing a maneuver such as a left turn would cause your car to shut down and refuse to restart, in which case you would have to reinstall the engine.

5. Macintosh would make a car that was powered by the sun, was reliable, five times as fast and twice as easy to drive - but would run on only five percent of the roads.

6. The oil, water temperature, and alternator warning lights would all be replaced by a single 'This Car Has Performed An Illegal Operation'warning light.



7. The airbag system would ask 'Are you sure?' before deploying.



8. Occasionally, for no reason whatsoever, your car would lock you out and refuse to let you in until you simultaneously lifted the door handle, turned the key and grabbed hold of the radio antenna.

9. Every time a new car was introduced car buyers would have to learn how to drive all over again be cause none of the controls would operate in the same manner as the old car.

10. You'd have to press the 'Start' button to turn the engine off.



PS - I'd like to add that when all else fails, you could call 'customer service' in some foreign country and be instructed in some foreign language how to fix your car yourself!!!!
 
If You’re a ‘Little Guy,’ a Contract Means Nothing


Posted on Mar 19, 2009

http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20090318_the_more_things_stay_the_same/


By Marie Cocco


With due deference to George Orwell, all contracts are equal. But some contracts are more equal than others.

Contracts entered into by the hotshots at American International Group for $165 million in bonuses, signed just months before their web of financial cunning unraveled, are inviolate. Contracts entered into by shop-floor workers at auto plants must be renegotiated, so that the taxpayers who bail out the industry don’t coddle supposedly overpaid union members.

Contracts that secured “retention” bonuses for the same wizards who engineered the flimsy financial products that helped bring down the world economy went to 73 individuals who received $1 million or more—with the top honcho getting $6.4 million. Contracts that secured retiree health benefits for autoworkers with creation of a special trust are being rewritten so that carmakers can use their own cut-rate stocks, not cash, to help fund their obligation to elderly people who once worked on assembly lines.

Contracts that were crafted at AIG early in 2008—a few months before taxpayers sent their first installment of bailout money to the insatiable insurance giant—must stand. The deals guaranteed that some bonus recipients would lock in as much money as they had received in 2007, before the company’s downward spiral.

Contracts agreed to by the United Auto Workers in 2007 trimmed wages and created the controversial trust for retiree health benefits that allowed the automakers to effectively remove some costs of the promised benefits from their own balance sheets. That contract does not stand.

As just renegotiated by Ford—which didn’t take federal bailout money—and the UAW, workers gave up cost-of-living adjustments, two years of “bonuses” they’d been promised instead of wage hikes, vacation days, break time and other benefits. Rules are to be changed so that workers can stay on the job more than eight hours in variable shifts, without being paid overtime.

UAW President Ron Gettelfinger told Congress in December that workers and retirees both were ready “to make further sacrifices” to ensure the industry’s viability in the wake of the credit crisis—a crisis caused in part by AIG’s exotic financial instruments. “We are willing to do our part,” Gettelfinger told the Senate Banking Committee.

AIG chief Edward Liddy told a House subcommittee Wednesday that though he runs a company now 80 percent owned by the taxpayers, it still must operate as a business that takes account of the “cold realities” of competition for customers, revenue and, yes, employees. Because of this and “certain legal obligations,” the big bonus payouts went into the pockets of some of the people who messed up the credit markets so badly that average Americans now have trouble getting car loans and auto dealers struggle to keep operating.

AIG has thus far received $170 billion in taxpayer money. General Motors, the car company considered to be in the deepest trouble, got $13.4 billion. GM is currently in negotiations with the UAW that are likely to result in more concessions from the union.

Larry Summers, the chief White House economic adviser, said on Sunday that AIG’s bonuses had to go through because “there are contracts. The government cannot just abrogate contracts.” Summers made the comments to ABC News three days after President Barack Obama learned of the bonus payments but uttered not a word publicly about them.

Now the White House and Congress are ablaze with indignation and vow to try to recoup every penny.

New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, quicker and more sure-footed than the lethargic Obama administration, got an accounting of how the millions were doled out. It shows, among other things, that 11 of those who received “retention” bonuses of $1 million or more—including an employee who pocketed $4.6 million—no longer work at the firm. The top seven bonus recipients received more than $4 million each.

The top-tier wage for production workers at UAW plants is about $28 an hour. New hires are paid $14 an hour.

Cuomo conveyed the preliminary results of his AIG probe in a letter to Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. “Something is deeply wrong with this outcome,” Cuomo wrote.
Something, indeed.

Marie Cocco’s e-mail address is mariecocco(at)washpost.com.
© 2009, Washington Post Writers Group
 

ANd you know who gave that story to FOX news?

The Albion, Indiana vote to terminate the Union was organized by the anti-Union "National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation" organization:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOJEXi8YH2Q


That organization is funded by corporations for the express purpose of breaking unions.


What they DIDN'T say in the Fox News Story, is that workers at
10 OTHER DANA Corp plants also voted to GET a Union.

See the REAL story here:
http://www.uaw.org/solidarity/08/0208/feature03.php
 
[FONT=&quot]Unions. A thing of the past, aka a dinosaur that is lying dying on the ground, but IBEW's and Autoworkers keep it on life support. Unions have far far outlived their usefulness, and are merely a vehicle for corruption.

They are nothing more than legitimized bootthugs, like attorneys. They have ruined productivity, quality and integrity of American products in our country in the last 25 years!
[/FONT]
 
Are those darn unions are getting in the way? SORRY. I guess we should do away with USC 5 also? Dismantle the FLRA and the NLRB, would that make you happy? How about OSHA and EEO, they must have caused trouble. Should they also go? Management always does the right thing, even when no one is looking...right?

"A thing of the past" - No, I think labor unions and collective bargaining will around for a while. BTW, It's kind of funny you quote Hillary in your signature with your adamant anti-union stance.
 
Pastor Manning has a new message for us today.
He mentions that Hitler had his Volkswagen and that Obama will have his own people's car.

 
They Can Build Them; Why Can't We?

Forbes - ‎1 hour ago‎


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They Can Build Them; Why Can't We?


Jerry Flint, 05.28.09, 6:00 PM ETChrysler is bankrupt and General
Motors may be next. Both those companies and Ford Motor--which is neither bankrupt nor on the dole from the federal government--are shutting plants. In contrast, the non-U.S. automakers are still building U.S. factories. Volkswagen is erecting an assembly plant in Tennessee, Kia Motors has a plant going up in Georgia, and Toyota Motor is putting one up in Mississippi, although it has delayed opening there because of the slump in auto sales.

Foreign auto manufacturers and suppliers already have a massive presence in the U.S. Many of these new transplant factories are in the Sun Belt: South Carolina (BMW), Mississippi (Nissan), Tennessee (Nissan), Alabama (Mercedes, Honda and Hyundai), Texas (Toyota), and Kentucky (Toyota).

The foreigners do have a few plants in the North, too: Honda in Ohio and Indiana, and Toyota and Subaru-Toyota in Indiana.

Most of the foreign-owned plants are non-union, with a few exceptions. Mitsubishi has a unionized plant in Illinois, though the future of that factory is uncertain. Mazda builds cars in a Ford-run plant in Michigan, and there is a unionized Toyota-GM joint venture in Fremont, Calif. Italy's Fiat plans to build its vehicles in one or more Chrysler facilities (all of Chrysler's plants are unionized).

This transplant industry is replacing Detroit's manufacturing. Through mid May, all North American assembly plants (including Canada and Mexico) have built 2.77 million cars and light trucks, half the production level of the year-earlier period. Of these, Detroit's Big Three have built only 1.5 million of these vehicles, just 268,000 more than the transplants.

It may only be weeks or a few months before the transplants will be building more vehicles here than our old Big Three. The foreign producers have reduced production in this downturn, but they have not permanently closed plants. Except for the Mitsubishi factory in Illinois, the others all seem safe.

When times are good, these American transplants are quite profitable--in fact, they are the greatest earning centers for Toyota and Honda. But it wasn't always this way: A while back, I recall the chief financial officer of Toyota (he later became chief executive) coming to America and telling me: "General Motors makes money manufacturing cars in the U.S. Ford makes money building cars in the U.S. I'm here to find out why we aren't making money building cars in the U.S."

Toyota solved its problems, while the Detroit automakers collapsed. One reason: the unions.

The Detroit auto plants are all unionized (United Auto Workers), and union stewards are on the company payroll at every car plant, at a cost of millions of dollars. The UAW works to keep the production pace down. One "transplant" plant manager who used to work for Detroit figures his people were working 10% faster that at a Detroit plant. If Detroit workers did 50 jobs an hour, his people did 55.

Detroit pay and benefits ran about $55 an hour, vs. an average of $45 for the transplants, with Korean automakers paying less. Those "legacy" costs--health care and pension payments to retirees--add another $16 an hour to the domestics' costs. So Detroit's total labor runs about $70 to $75 an hour, vs. $49 for Japanese transplants.
 
continued

In the current crisis, the union has been making big concessions, but it's too late. The transplant workers are new, young and country-style.

Suddenly, they had real jobs and futures--instead of pumping gas or growing old working at burger joints. The Big Three workers are older, tired and often from urban environments. Doing less was always the goal, and they bragged about it, too, which is why auto workers may not be particularly popular, even in their own towns. Foreign manufacturers, with American plant managers, won over their factory workers with a new culture: uniforms for everyone, democracy in the parking lot and no executive dining rooms.

The foreign culture was about more than parking spaces. Its real focus was on eliminating class warfare from the factory floor. The Japanese and the Germans, too, put particular emphasis on teamwork and quality. Detroit talked a lot about quality but did not always deliver on its promises. Quality means everything from poor fit and finish, gaps between exterior and interior parts, hard plastic that looks cheap and transmissions that break down at 50,000 miles. My favorite Detroit expression was "perceived quality." That meant if you paid $30,000 for a car and found a scratch in the door, it wasn't a quality issue. Why? The car still ran, so it was "perceived quality."

Listen to Robert Dewar, who worked at Ford's Sharonville, Ohio, transmission plant in the late 1970s: "Final quality fluctuated with the amount of power granted to the Quality Control Department. When sales were strong and growing, QC was treated like an annoyance that was getting in the way of making the numbers. If a QC supervisor tried to be a hero, and made a stand, production simply went to engineering and got an 'engineering deviation,' which allowed the use of defective parts in the interests of production. So much for control of quality."

As quality complaints piled up, Detroit tried to imitate the foreigners, and we heard a lot about quality programs, quality circles and quality gurus. Why didn't they succeed? Robert Dewer's book, A Savage Factory, describes the factory floor like a constant war between rival street gangs, management vs. the union and workers. His book is well worth a read.
Toyota took over a badly managed GM plant in California; it was a joint venture, but the Japanese ran the plant. GM sent young executives to work there and learn Toyota's manufacturing and quality techniques. They learned, but when they came back to GM, the GM bureaucracy would not change its ways.

Under former Chief Executive Roger Smith, GM set up the new Saturn factory with a new type of work-together atmosphere with the UAW: no time clocks, annual pay and teams. The company and the union both hated the new ideas, and when Roger was gone and the UAW got a new president, they worked at--and eventually succeeded in--destroying the Saturn brand.

Even the good car people--like Robert Lutz, who saved Chrysler and led the product revival at GM before its fall--did not believe there was a quality gap between Detroit's cars and the transplants. But mechanics working on cars knew better, when they kept finding failures in sub-assemblies such as the heating and air conditioning systems, which are hard to get at and expensive to repair.

Detroit's problems go beyond the factory floor; Washington also deserves blame for the catastrophe. Our politicians refused to defend the auto industry, allowing the Japanese to develop their car business here with imports paid for with undervalued currency. Our government never insisted on realistic currency exchange, or that foreign countries, including Japan and Korea, allow our companies to manufacture on their soil and sell in their markets.

Why wasn't our government more demanding? The Pentagon and the State Department were more interested in seeing Japan and South Korea with strong capitalistic economies and as bastions against communism. They never really cared about Midwestern metal-benders.

Asian nations were not overt, but instead used subtle means to discourage U.S. companies from making strong inroads into their markets. Ford, for example, once announced it would build an assembly plant in Yokohama, Japan. Then the authorities condemned the site for the construction of a sewage plant. At one time, the South Korean equivalent of the IRS investigated anyone who bought a foreign car. The exception: If a foreign company was going down, foreign governments allowed the Americans to come in and save it, as the Koreans allowed GM to take over and rescue Daewoo.

Then there are government rules and regulations: the Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and others. This is not to say that all those rules on worker safety, on pollution and everything else are not good, but they do push up costs. We know the same rules do not exist in China, Mexico and South Korea.

State governments have also done their share to help cripple the home team. They heavily subsidized the building of new plants by foreign car makers. Such aid included paying for roads, water and sewage, worker training and tax relief. A $500 million subsidy per plant was not unusual. Foreigners have been building cars in new, modern factories, built for flexible production, with tax abatements, while Detroit companies were stuck in less efficient plants.

At one time, General Motors considered a Southern strategy--building new plants in areas where workers were unlikely to vote in a union. The United Auto Workers made it clear it would fight, legally or illegally--meaning strikes, slowdowns and chaos in GM's more northern plants. GM gave up on the idea.

What about Detroit's managers? Exports from America were never important to them: GM and Ford believed in building the cars that people wanted, but building them in their respective markets. Thus, they had operations in Europe that built cars the Europeans liked, and the same in South America and China. That was fine, but American executives also had a prejudice against small cars and small engines. In the Midwest, bigger is better.

The truth is that a smaller car costs nearly as much to build as a bigger car, and our execs could not see how they could sell a smaller car unless its sticker price was considerably below that of a bigger car. This enormous mistake opened the market here to the foreign automakers, which developed a growing market for smaller cars, and then moved up-market to bigger, more expensive and higher-margined vehicles.

It has not helped that the modern leaders of Detroit were preoccupied with Wall Street, the stock price, quarterly projections and stockholder values. In contrast, the Japanese focused on product quality and engineering, and continuously improving their factory systems.

One more thing: Car plants become profitable when running full and with overtime. To do that, the car companies must build vehicles the customers want. Detroit's managers not only didn't care about the factories, they didn't care about the products or understand American car buyers.
Times have changed. The worker-management battles in Detroit's factories may have ended. The union and companies may embrace each other, and the quality may be as good as the foreign competition. Unfortunately, Detroit may have already damaged its reputation beyond repair.

Yes, Washington's lack of interest and support, state subsidies of foreign manufacturing, high union wages and inflexible work rules all hurt domestic car companies. But the failure of American managers to build better cars is what really has led to the crisis in Detroit.
 
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