Greenspan Quotations
Here are some Greenspan quotations worthy of a close read as they foretell what will transpire in the next 4-6 years. These gems were often buried in speeches where he seemingly was talking in tongues and in which his audience's eyes were all glazed over. No one will ever be able to pin the tail on this donkey because he can show everyone, after the calamity, that he gave fair warning in spite of the fact he contributed greatly to it. Afterall, he gave the debt slaves exactly what they begged for and that was more debt.
Although I have no respect for this man and his tenure as Fed Chairman, I wouldn't take an opposing bet with him. Would you?
Enjoy...
October, 1998, pertaining to the Long Term Capital Management crisis:
"On occasion there will be mistakes made, as there were in LTCM and I will forecast without knowing who, what or where, that there will be many more. I would suspect there are potential disasters running into a very large number, in the hundreds." – Alan Greenspan
As to risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Greenspan warned in February 2004:
"The Federal Reserve is concerned about the growth and scale of the GSEs' mortgage portfolios, which concentrate interest rate and prepayment risks at these two institutions." – Alan Greenspan
Jackson Hole, Wyoming on August 26, 2005:
"This vast increase in the market value of asset claims [stocks, bonds, houses] is in part the indirect result of investors accepting lower compensation for risk. Such an increase in market value is too often viewed by market participants as structural and permanent… But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear . . . history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums." --Alan Greenspan
Jackson Hole on August 27, 2005:
"Nearer term, the housing boom will inevitably simmer down. As part of that process, house turnover will decline from currently historic levels, while home price increases will slow and prices could even decrease. As a consequence, home equity extraction will ease and with it some of the strength in personal consumption expenditures." – Alan Greenspan
US House of Representatives, February 11, 2004:
"The imbalance in the federal budgetary situation, unless addressed soon, will pose serious longer-term fiscal difficulties. Our demographics--especially the retirement of the baby-boom generation beginning in just a few years--mean that the ratio of workers to retirees will fall substantially. Without corrective action, this development will put substantial pressure on our ability in coming years to provide even minimal government services while maintaining entitlement benefits at their current level, without debilitating increases in tax rates. The longer we wait before addressing these imbalances, the more wrenching the fiscal adjustment ultimately will be." -- Alan Greenspan
House Budget Committee, March 2005:
"When you begin to do the arithmetic of what the rising debt level implied by the deficits tells you and add interest costs to that ever-rising debt at ever-higher interest rates, the system becomes fiscally destabilizing. What you end up with is probably a stagnant economic system." – Alan Greenspan
Budget Committee, US Senate, April 21, 2005:
"I fear that we may have already committed more physical resources to the baby-boom generation in its retirement years than our economy has the capacity to deliver." -- Alan Greenspan
National Italian American Foundation, Washington, D.C., October 15, 2004:
" . . . the current situation reflects an increasing fear that existing reserves and productive crude oil capacity have become subject to potential geopolitical adversity. These anxieties patently are not frivolous given the stark realities evident in many areas of the world." – Alan Greenspan
Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, July 20, 2005:
"Large deficits result in rising interest rates and ever-growing interest payments that augment deficits in future years. Unless that trend is reversed, at some point these deficits would cause the economy to stagnate or worse." – Alan Greenspan
Jackson Hole, August 27, 2005:
"Monetary policy, for example, cannot ignore the potential inflationary pressures inherent in our current fiscal outlook, especially those that could arise in meeting commitments to future retirees. However, I assume that these imbalances will be resolved before stark choices again confront us and that, if they are not, the Fed would resist any temptation to monetize future fiscal deficits. We had too much experience with the dangers of inflation in the 1970s to tolerate going through another bout of dispiriting stagflation. The consequences for both future workers and retirees could be daunting." -- Alan Greenspan
Banking conference in Germany, November 19, 2004:
"The fiscal issues that we face pose long-term challenges, but federal budget deficits could cause difficulties even in the relatively near term. Long-term interest rates reflect not only the balance between the current demand for, and current supply of, credit, they also incorporate markets' expectations of those balances in the future. As a consequence, should investors become significantly more doubtful that the Congress will take the necessary fiscal measures, an appreciable backup in long-term interest rates is possible as prospects for outsized federal demands on national saving become more apparent. Such a development could constrain investment and other interest-sensitive spending and thus undermine the private capital formation that is a key element in our economy's growth prospects." -- Alan Greenspan
Greenspan went on to say:
"Rising interest rates have been advertised for so long and in so many places that anyone who hasn't appropriately hedged his position by now is desirous of losing money." -- Alan Greenspan
Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, February 11, 2004:
"To date, the US current account deficit has been financed with little difficulty. . . investors evidently continue to perceive the United States as an excellent place to invest. Moreover, some governments have accumulated large amounts of dollar-denominated debt as a byproduct of resisting upward exchange rate adjustment. Nonetheless, given the already-substantial accumulation of dollar-denominated debt, foreign investors, both private and official, may become less willing to absorb ever-growing claims on US residents." – Alan Greenspan
European Banking Congress 2004, Frankfurt, Germany, November 19, 2004:
"…net claims against residents of the United States cannot continue to increase forever in international portfolios at their recent pace. . .
Given the size of the US current account deficit, a diminished appetite for adding to dollar balances must occur at some point. The trade deficit cannot continue to increase forever at the recent pace." –Alan Greenspan
From a 1967 article entitled Gold and Economic Freedom:
"The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the 'hidden' confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard." -- Alan Greenspan
December 19, 2002, Economic Club of New York in New York City:
"In the two decades following the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933, the Consumer Price Index in the United States nearly doubled. And, in the four decades after that, prices quintupled. Monetary policy, unleashed from the constraint of domestic gold convertibility, had allowed a persistent over issuance of money. As recently as a decade ago, central bankers, having witnessed more than a half-century of chronic inflation, appeared to confirm that a fiat currency was inherently subject to excess." -- Alan Greenspan
In 1996…Greenspan’s most famous warning:
"But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?" – Alan Greenspan
-------------
Again, who wants to place a bet opposite of this man's forecasts?